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Origin and Evolution of the Term 
 
Organization Theory has abundant literature on decentralized organizations of several kinds ​(Shubik,            
1962; Beckhard, 1966; Freeland and Baker, 1975)​. Yet, the first references to actual “Decentralized              
Autonomous Organization” (DAO) only emerged in the 90s, to describe multi-agent systems in an              
IoT environment ​(Dilger, 1997) or nonviolent decentralized action in the counter-globalization social            
movement ​(Schneider, 2014)​. 
 
However, the modern meaning of DAOs can be traced back to the earlier concept of a Decentralized                 
Autonomous Corporation (DAC), coined a few years after the appearance of Bitcoin ​(Nakamoto,             
2008)​. The DAC concept was used mostly informally in online forums and chats by early               
crypto-currency enthusiasts, using both “decentralized” and “distributed” autonomous corporations         
interchangeably. It was only in 2013 that the term became more widely adopted, and publicly               
discussed in a variety of websites (S. Larimer 2013) (D. Larimer 2013), in particular by the                
co-founder of Bitcoin Magazine Vitalik Buterin  ​(Buterin, 2013)​.  1
 
DACs were described as a new corporate governance form, using tokenized tradable shares as a               
means of providing dividends to shareholders. Such corporations were described as “incorruptible”,            
running “without any human involvement” and with“publicly auditable” bylaws as “open source            
software distributed across the computers of their stakeholders” (S. Larimer 2013). According to this              
definition, anyone could become a stakeholder in a DAC by simply “buying stock in the company or                 
being paid in that stock to provide services for the company”. As a result, the owners of a DAC stock                    
would be entitled to “a share of its profits, participation in its growth, and/or a say in how it is run”.                     
(ibid). Such a definition reflects the maximalist view of many blockchain advocates considering that              
“DACs don’t need regulation” because “you don’t want to regulate them, and happily you can’t”               
(ibid).  
 
The term was inherently linked to corporate governance and therefore was too restrictive for many               
blockchain-based applications with a more general-purpose. Thus, several alternatives to the term            
appeared, leading to the emergence of Decentralized Applications (DApps) ​(Johnston, 2013)​, and            
later to the generalization of DAOs as a replacement for DACs. ​(Buterin 2014)​. 
 
1 Vitalik Buterin would later co-found the Ethereum platform in 2014. 
 
While some argue that Bitcoin is effectively the first DAO ​(Buterin 2014)​(Hsieh ​et al.​, 2019)​, the                
term is today understood as referring not to a blockchain network in and of itself, but rather to                  
organisations deployed as smart contracts on top of an existing blockchain network. Although there              
have been several attempts at instantiating a DAO on the Ethereum blockchain ​(Tufnell, 2014)​, the               
first DAO that attracted widespread attention is a 2016 venture capital fund confusingly called              
“TheDAO” ​(DuPont, 2017)​. Despite the short-life of the experiment , TheDAO has inspired a variety              2
of new DAOs (e.g. MolochDAO, MetaCartel), including several platforms aimed at facilitating DAO             
deployment with a DAO-as-a-service model, such as Aragon, DAOstack, Colony or DAOhaus.  
 
The DAO concept has enabled other derived terms: the term Decentralized Collaborative            
Organization (DCO) is typically referred as a DAO with strengthened collaborative aspects ​(Hall,             
2015)​(Schiener, 2015)​(Davidson, de Filippi and Potts, 2018)​; a more elaborate concept derived from             
those attempts is “Distributed Cooperative Organization” (DisCO), which highlights its co-op and            
democratic nature ​(DisCO ​Manifesto​, 2019)​. 
 
Definitions in the field 
 
There are multiple coexisting definitions of DAOs in use within the industry. The most relevant are 
the following:  
● Buterin, in the Ethereum white paper ​(Ethereum, 2013)​, defines a DAO as a “virtual entity 
that has a certain set of members or shareholders which [...] have the right to spend the 
entity's funds and modify its code”. That is, the aim is to replicate “the legal trappings of a 
traditional company or nonprofit but using only cryptographic blockchain technology for 
enforcement”.  
● Some of the most popular DAO platforms, such as DAOstack and Aragon define a DAO               
similarly as ”a network of stakeholders with no central governing body” (​https://daostack.io​),            
“which is regulated by a set of automatically enforceable rules on a public blockchain”              
(​https://aragon.org/dao​). Conversely, other DAOs platforms have opted to use a different           
terminology as a proxy to a DAO, such as the “colonies” of Colony (​https://colony.io​) or               
DAOhaus’ “magic internet communities”(​http://daohaus.club​). 
 
In the academic literature on DAOs, although some works avoid picking a definition (Norta et al                
2015) or refer to industry definitions (DiRose and Mansouri, 2018), multiple attempts have been made               
at providing a specific definition of DAOs. Most of these definitions include the following distinctive               
characteristics:  
● DAOs enable people to coordinate and self-govern themselves online​. Although no           3
mention is made as to the minimum size of the group, the term “organization” is generally                
understood to refer to an entity comprising multiple people acting towards a common goal ,              4
rather than a legally registered organization.  
2 This open-source project attracted 11,000 investors and $150M, where the funds were operated by the code 
implemented, theoretically safe from managerial corruption. However, a bug in its code enabled vulnerabilities 
exploited by an attacker who stole $50M, requiring a fork in the Ethereum blockchain to restore the funds. 
3 See e.g. Singh and Kim (2019) who describe a DAO as a “a novel scalable, self-organizing coordination on the 
blockchain, controlled by smart contracts”  
4 See e.g.  El Faqir, Arroyo and Hassan (2020) according to which a DAO is made up of.“people with common 
goals that join under a blockchain infrastructure that enforces a set of shared rules” 
 
● A DAO source code is ​deployed in a blockchain ​with smart contract capabilities like              
Ethereum—arguably always a public  blockchain. 5
● A DAO’s smart contract code specifies the ​rules ​for interaction among people —although it             6
is unclear to which extent there may be other governance mechanisms that can affect or               
overrule  such code.  7
● Since these rules are defined using ​smart contracts​, they are self-executed ​independently of             
the will of the parties.   8
● The DAO governance should remain ​independent from central control​: e.g. some           9
definitions specifically refer to self-governed (De Filippi and Hassan 2018), self-organizing           
(Singh & Kim 2019), peer-to-peer and democratic control (Hsieh et al., 2018).  
● Since they rely on a blockchain, DAOs inherit some of its properties, such as ​transparency​,               
cryptographic security​, and ​decentralization  
10
 
Current open discussions 
 
While the academic literature on DAOs is still fairly limited, there is a significant number of papers                 
from the field of computer sciences focusing on blockchain technology as a technical platform for               
building new blockchain-based business models, such as decentralized exchanges (Lin & al. 2019;             
Bansal & al. 2019) or market-based platforms such as prediction markets (Clark & al. 2014) that                
operate as decentralized organizations with automated governance (Jentzsch 2016, Singh & Kim            
2019). Yet, a DAO can be deployed to fulfill many different types of functions. A DAO can, for                  
example, be used to create a virtual entity that operates as a crowd-funding platform, a ride-sharing                
platform, a fully automated company, or a fully automated decision-making apparatus. It is therefore              
important to understand that a DAO is not a particular type of business model or a particular type of                   
organization, but a concept that can be used to refer to a wide variety of things. 
 
In terms of governance, a variety of scholars recently started investigating the opportunities of              
blockchain technology and smart contracts to experiment with open and distributed governance            
structures (Leonhard 2017, Rozas & al. 2018; Hsieh & al. 2018, Jonas 2019), along with the challenges                 
and limitations of doing so (Garrod 2016, DuPont 2017, Scott & al. 2017, Chohan 2017, Verstreate                
2018, Minn 2019, Hutten 2019). There is also an emerging body of literature from the field of                 
economic and legal theory concerning DAOs. While most of these works focus on the new               
opportunities of decentralized blockchain-based organisations in the realm of economics and           
governance (Davidson & al. 2016, 2018; Sims 2019; Rikken & al. 2019; Kaal 2020), others focus on                 
5 See e.g. Hsieh et al. (2018) claiming that a DAO should be deployed on a “public network” 
6 See e.g.  De Filippi and Hassan (2018), describing a DAO as a“self-governed organization controlled only and 
exclusively by an incorruptible set of rules, implemented under the form of a smart contract”.  
7 See e.g. Singth & Kim (2019)’s definition of a DAO as “an organization whose essential operations are 
automated agreeing to rules and principles assigned in code without human involvement”. However, this 
definition is put into question by Reijers, Wuisman, Mannan, De Filippi & al. (2018) distinguishing between 
“on-chain” and “off-chain” governance in the governance structure of DAOs. 
8 See also De Filippi & Wright (2018), according to which a DAO “represents the most advanced state of 
automation, where a blockchain-based organization is run not by humans or group consensus, but rather entirely 
by smart contracts, algorithms, and deterministic code.” 
9 See e.g. Hsieh et al. (2018) describing DAOs as “non-hierarchical organizations that perform and record 
routine tasks on a peer-to-peer, cryptographically secure, public network, and rely on the voluntary contributions 
of their internal stakeholders to operate, manage, and evolve the organization through a democratic consultation 
process” (Hsieh et al., 2018) 
10 ​“A decentralized, transparent, and secure system for operation and governance among independent 
participants” which “can run autonomously” (Beck, 2018) 
 
the legal issues of DAOs from either a theoretical (De Filippi & Wright 2018; Reijers & al. 2018) or                   
practical perspective (Rodrigues 2018; Werbach 2018; Riva 2019). 
The political discourse around DAOs is more pronounced, at least in the context of many existing                
blockchain communities (Scott 2015; Swartz 2017; DuPont 2019). Various authors have pointed out             
that DAOs could be used to further economic and political decentralization in ways that may enable a                 
more democratic and participatory form of governance (Swan 2015; Atzori 2015; Allen & al. 2017,               
Tapscott & Tapscott 2017). However, as the limitations of blockchain-based governance came into             
light, especially in the aftermath of the aforementioned TheDAO hack (DuPont 2017, Reijers & al.               
2018, Mehar & al. 2019), the public discourse around DAOs has shifted from describing DAOs as a                 
technical solution to a governance problem (Jentzsch 2016, Voshmgir 2017) to a discussion on how               
DAOs could change the nature of economic and political governance in general (Davidson & al. 2016,                
Beck & al. 2018, Zwitter & Hazenberg 2020, De Filippi & al. 2020). 
 
The use of the term “decentralized autonomous organisation” or DAO is now fairly established in the                
blockchain space, yet there are still many misconceptions and unresolved issues in the discussion              
around the term. (1) First of all, with regard to the “decentralization” aspect of a DAO, it is unclear                   
whether decentralization only needs to be established on the infrastructural layer (i.e. at the level of the                 
underlying blockchain-based network) or whether it also need to be implemented at the governance              
level (i.e. the DAO should not be controlled by any centralized actor or group of actors). (2) Second, it                   
is unclear whether a DAO must be fully autonomous and fully automated (i.e. the DAO should operate                 
without any human intervention whatsoever), or whether the concept of “autonomy” should be             
interpreted in a weaker sense, (i.e. while the DAO, as an organization, may require the participation of                 
its members, its governance should not be dependent on the whims of a small group of actors). (3)                  
Third, there are some debates as to when the community of actors interacting with a smart contract can                  
be regarded as an actual “organization” (independently on the legal recognition). For instance, it is               
unclear whether the mere act of transacting with a smart contract qualifies as an organisational activity,                
or whether a stronger degree of involvement is necessary, such as having a governance model or                
collective interactions amongst participants.  
 
The latter has triggered important discussions in the blockchain and legal field, as regards whether a                
DAO could be considered as an entity separate from the human entities that operate it (i.e. as a legal                   
person) or whether it can only be considered as an entity when it is identified as such by the law (i.e.                     
the law should identify a DAO as a legal person for the DAO to be considered as such). Yet, the                    
common understanding today is that the “autonomous” nature of a DAO is incompatible with the               
notion of legal personhood, as legal personhood can only be established if there is one or more                 
identified actors responsible for the actions of a particular entity. The discussion on whether a DAO                
should be recognized as a legal person has important implications in the legal field, as it can determine                  
the extent to which a DAO can be considered as a separate legal entity from its human actors, and                   




A DAO is a blockchain-based system that enables people to coordinate and self-govern themselves 
mediated by a set of self-executing rules deployed on a public blockchain, and whose governance is 






1. Allen, D. W., Berg, C., Lane, A. M., & Potts, J. (2017). The economics of crypto-democracy. ​Available 
at SSRN 2973050​. ​https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973050  
2. Atzori, M. (2015). Blockchain technology and decentralized governance: Is the state still necessary?. 
Available at SSRN 2709713​. ​https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709713  
3. Bansal, G., Hasija, V., Chamola, V., Kumar, N., & Guizani, M. (2019, December). Smart Stock 
Exchange Market: A Secure Predictive Decentralized Model. In 2019 IEEE Global Communications 
Conference (GLOBECOM) (pp. 1-6). IEEE. DOI: 10.1109/GLOBECOM38437.2019.9013787 
4. Beck, R., Müller-Bloch, C., & King, J. L. (2018). Governance in the blockchain economy: A framework 
and research agenda. ​Journal of the Association for Information Systems​, ​19​(10), 1. 
5. Beckhard, R. (1966) ‘An Organization Improvement Program in a Decentralized Organization’, ​The 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science​, pp. 3–25. DOI: ​10.1177/002188636600200102​. 
6. Buterin, V. (2013) ​Bootstrapping A Decentralized Autonomous Corporation: Part I​. Available at: 
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bootstrapping-a-decentralized-autonomous-corporation-part-i-137
9644274​ (Accessed: 14 September 2020). 
7. Buterin, V. (2014) ​DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide​.  Ethereum Blog. 
Available at: 
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/ 
(Accessed: 14 September 2020). 
8. Clark, J., Bonneau, J., Felten, E. W., Kroll, J. A., Miller, A., & Narayanan, A. (2014, June). On 
decentralizing prediction markets and order books. In Workshop on the Economics of Information 
Security, State College, Pennsylvania (Vol. 188). 
9. Chohan, U. (2017). The Decentralized Autonomous Organization and Governance Issues. UNSW 
Business School; ​Critical Blockchain Research Initiative (CBRI) Working Paper​. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3082055  
10. Davidson, S., De Filippi, P., & Potts, J. (2016). Disrupting governance: The new institutional economics 
of distributed ledger technology. ​SSRN Working Paper ​https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2811995  
11. Davidson, S., de Filippi, P. and Potts, J. (2018) ‘Blockchains and the economic institutions of 
capitalism’, ​Journal of Institutional Economics​. Cambridge University Press, 14(4), pp. 639–658. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000200  
12. Davidson, S., De Filippi, P., & Potts, J. (2016). Economics of blockchain. Available at SSRN 2744751. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2744751  
13. De Filippi, P., Mannan, M., & Reijers, W. (2020). Blockchain as a confidence machine: The problem of 
trust & challenges of governance. ​Technology in Society​, ​62​, 101284. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2020.101284  
14. Dilger, W. (1997) ‘Decentralized autonomous organization of the intelligent home according to the 
principle of the immune system’, in ​1997 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics. Computational Cybernetics and Simulation​, pp. 351–356 vol.1. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSMC.1997.625775  
15. DisCO ​Manifesto​ (2019). Available at: ​https://disco.coop/manifesto/​ (Accessed: 14 September 2020). 
16. DuPont, Q. (2017). Experiments in algorithmic governance: A history and ethnography of “The DAO,” 
a failed decentralized autonomous organization. Campbell-Verduyn, M. (ed.) ​Bitcoin and Beyond. 
Routledge, pp. 157-177 
17. DuPont, Q. (2019). ​Cryptocurrencies and blockchains​. John Wiley & Sons 
18. Ethereum (2013). ​Ethereum Whitepaper​. Ethereum.org. Available at: 
https://ethereum.org/en/whitepaper/ (Accessed: 14 September 2020). 
19. Franklin, S. and Graesser, A. (1996) ‘Is it an Agent, or just a Program?: A Taxonomy for Autonomous 
Agents’, In International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (pp. 21-35). 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.​ https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0013570 
20. Freeland, J. R. and Baker, N. R. (1975) ‘Goal partitioning in a hierarchical organization’, ​Omega​, pp. 
673–688. DOI: ​10.1016/0305-0483(75)90070-5​. 
21. Garrod, J. Z. (2016). The real world of the decentralized autonomous society. ​tripleC: Communication, 
Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society​, ​14​(1), 
62-77. ​https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v14i1.692  
22. Hall, J. (2015) ​The Future of Organization​, ​Deep Code​. Available at: 
https://medium.com/deep-code/the-future-of-organization-b26219e5fc95​ (Accessed: 14 September 
2020). 
23. Hütten, M. (2019). The soft spot of hard code: blockchain technology, network governance and pitfalls 
of technological utopianism. ​Global Networks​, ​19​(3), 329-348. ​https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12217  
 
24. Hsieh, Y. Y., Vergne, J. P., Anderson, P., Lakhani, K., & Reitzig, M. (2018). Bitcoin and the rise of 
decentralized autonomous organizations. ​Journal of Organization Design​, ​7​(1), 1-16. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s41469-018-0038-1  
25. Jentzsch, C. (2016). Decentralized autonomous organization to automate governance. ​White paper​. 
26. Johnston, D. (2013) ​DavidJohnstonCEO/DecentralizedApplications​. Github. Available at: 
https://github.com/DavidJohnstonCEO/DecentralizedApplications​ (Accessed: 14 September 2020). 
27. Jones, K. (2019). Blockchain in or as governance? Evolutions in experimentation, social impacts, and 
prefigurative practice in the blockchain and DAO space. ​Information Polity​, (Preprint), 1-18. DOI: 
10.3233/IP-190157 
28. Kaal, W. A. (2020). Decentralized Corporate Governance via Blockchain Technology. Annals of 
Corporate Governance, 5(2), 101-147 ​http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/109.00000025  
29. Larimer, D. (2013) ​DAC Revisited​. ​Lets Talk Bitcoin. ​Available at: 
https://letstalkbitcoin.com/blog/post/dac-revisited​ (Accessed: 14 September 2020). 
30. Larimer, S. (2013)​ ​Bitcoin and the Three Laws of Robotics​. Lets Talk Bitcoin. Available at: 
https://letstalkbitcoin.com/blog/post/bitcoin-and-the-three-laws-of-robotics​ (Accessed: 14 September 
2020). 
31. Leonhard, R. (2017). Corporate Governance on Ethereum's Blockchain. ​SSRN Working Paper 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2977522  
32. Lin, L. X., Budish, E., Cong, L. W., He, Z., Bergquist, J. H., Panesir, M. S., ... & Wu, H. (2019). 
Deconstructing Decentralized Exchanges. Stanford Journal of Blockchain Law & Policy 
33. Mehar, M. I., Shier, C. L., Giambattista, A., Gong, E., Fletcher, G., Sanayhie, R., ... & Laskowski, M. 
(2019). Understanding a revolutionary and flawed grand experiment in blockchain: the DAO attack. 
Journal of Cases on Information Technology (JCIT)​, ​21​(1), 19-32 DOI: 10.4018/JCIT.2019010102 
34. Minn, K. T. (2019). Towards Enhanced Oversight of" Self-Governing" Decentralized Autonomous 
Organizations: Case Study of the DAO and Its Shortcomings. ​NYU J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. L.​, ​9​, 139 
35. Nakamoto, S. (2008) ‘Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system’. 
36. Norta, A., Othman, A. B., & Taveter, K. (2015). Conflict-resolution lifecycles for governed 
decentralized autonomous organization collaboration. Proceedings of the 2015 2nd International 
Conference on Electronic Governance and Open Society: Challenges in Eurasia (pp. 244-257). DOI: 
10.1145/2846012.2846052 
37. Reijers, W., Wuisman, I., Mannan, M., De Filippi, P., Wray, C., Rae-Looi, V., ... & Orgad, L. (2018). 
Now the Code Runs Itself: On-Chain and Off-Chain Governance of Blockchain Technologies. ​Topoi: 
An International Review of Philosophy​, pp. 1-11. ​https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9626-5  
38. Rikken, O., Janssen, M., & Kwee, Z. (2019). Governance challenges of blockchain and decentralized 
autonomous organizations. ​Information Polity​, (Preprint), 1-21 DOI: 10.3233/IP-190154 
39. Riva, Sven. "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) as Subjects of Law–the Recognition of 
DAOs in the Swiss Legal Order." ​Master's Thesis​ (2019). 
40. Rodrigues, U. R. (2018). Law and the Blockchain. Iowa L. Rev., 104, 679. 
41. Rozas, D., Tenorio-Fornés, A., Díaz-Molina, S., & Hassan, S. (2018). When ostrom meets blockchain: 
Exploring the potentials of blockchain for commons governance. ​Available at SSRN 3272329​. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3272329  
42. Scott, B. (2015). Visions of a techno-leviathan: The politics of the bitcoin blockchain. 
43. Scott, B., Loonam, J., & Kumar, V. (2017). Exploring the rise of blockchain technology: Towards 
distributed collaborative organizations. ​Strategic Change​, ​26​(5), 423-428 
https://doi.org/10.1002/jsc.2142  
44. Schiener, D. (2015) ​Reposium: The future of Wikipedia as a DCO​, ​Medium​. Available at: 
https://medium.com/@DomSchiener/reposium-dco-the-future-of-wikipedia-4be080cfa027​ (Accessed: 
14 September 2020). 
45. Schneider, N. (2014) ​Are You Ready to Trust a Decentralized Autonomous Organization?. Shareable​. 
Available at: 
https://www.shareable.net/are-you-ready-to-trust-a-decentralized-autonomous-organization/​ (Accessed: 
14 September 2020). 
46. Shubik, M. (1962) ‘Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal 
Pricing’, ​Management Science​, pp. 325–343. DOI: ​10.1287/mnsc.8.3.325​. 
47. Sims, A. (2019). Blockchain and Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs): The Evolution of 
Companies?. Available at SSRN ​https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3524674  
 
48. Singh, M., & Kim, S. (2019). Blockchain technology for decentralized autonomous organizations. In 
Advances in Computers​ (Vol. 115, pp. 115-140). Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.adcom.2019.06.001  
49. Swartz, L. (2017). Blockchain dreams: Imagining techno-economic alternatives after Bitcoin. Another 
economy is possible: culture and economy in a time of crisis, 82-105​. 
50. Tapscott, D., & Tapscott, A. (2017). How blockchain will change organizations. ​MIT Sloan 
Management Review​, ​58​(2), 10 
51. Tufnell, N. (2014) ​Bitcloud wants to replace the internet​. Wired UK. Available at: 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/bitcloud​ (Accessed: 14 September 2020). 
52. Verstraete, M. (2018). The Stakes of Smart Contracts. ​Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Issue 50 
53. Voshmgir, S. (2017). Disrupting governance with blockchains and smart contracts. ​Strategic Change​, 
26​(5), 499-509. ​https://doi.org/10.1002/jsc.2150  
54. Werbach, K. (2018). Trust, but verify: Why the blockchain needs the law. Berkeley Tech. LJ, 33, 487. 
https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38H41JM9N  
55. Zwitter, A., & Hazenberg, J. (2020). Decentralized Network Governance: Blockchain Technology and 
the Future of Regulation. ​Frontiers in Blockchain-Blockchain for Good, Forthcoming​. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3518080  
 
 
 
 
